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The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 represents the most significant change to the rights of 
homeless people in England for decades. Through an analysis of the history of homelessness 
legislation in England, but focusing on the ‘ground-breaking’ 2017 Act, this article explores 
how the homeless population is represented and ‘constructed’ in this new legislation and 
what this tells us about the place of homeless people in our society. In so doing, this article 
exposes how the 2017 Act, a State instrument of apparent homelessness prevention, can be 
read and understood as contributing to rather than obviating the marginalisation and social 








Homelessness, in recent years, has risen up the political agenda in England both in policy term
but also in capturing the public conscience; the latter perhaps best epitomised by the 
outpouring of collective grief surrounding the Grenfell Tower fire tragedy of 2017 and the 
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increased public awareness of homelessness during the Covid-19 pandemic.1 In 2019, the 
number of homeless households in England was up 46% on 2010 (290,000 households were 
accepted as homelessness or threatened with homelessness) and, in 2020, an estimated 
10,000 people were sleeping rough on any one night; up by over 150% in a decade. Moreover, 
it has been reported that 70,000 additional households have become homeless as a result of 
the Covid-19 pandemic so far with an ongoing and lasting legacy of homelessness anticipated 
to flow from the impact of the virus.2 Crucially, homelessness both causes and is the cause of 
marginalisation and social exclusion. To be homeless is to be excluded from society. 
Homelessness, poor quality and insecure housing all result from or lead to the detachment of 
citizens from community as well as from family, and from the welfare, labour and housing 
markets. Homelessness results in the most vulnerable individuals quite literally pushed to the 
 
 
1 There has been much legislative activity from 2010 including the Localism Act 2011, the 
Housing & Planning Act 2016 and the new Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 on which see C. 
Bevan, ‘The Localism Act 2011: The Hollow Housing Law Revolution,’ The Modern Law 
Review, 77(6), 964-982; C. Bevan., and E. Laurie., ‘The Housing and Planning Act 2016: 
Rewarding the Aspiration of Homeownership?’ The Modern Law Review, 80(4), 661-684. See 
Covid-19 initiatives such as the ‘Everyone In’ scheme and the recent Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government policy paper, The Charter for Social Housing Residents: 
Social Housing White Paper (2021). 
 
2 See Homelessness Monitor for England (Crisis, 2021) and data compiled for the Observer 
newspaper, 9th January 2021. 
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margins of society; falling outside the protective net of employment, of healthcare, of 
welfare, of ‘home’ and even living on the street. There is a growing appreciation that, while 
welfare policies can counter social exclusion and marginalisation, they can also contribute to 
it. In the housing arena, work by Pawson, Kintrea (2002) and others has identified, for 
example, how social housing allocation policy can actively generate social exclusion.  
 
Drawing on the history of homelessness legislation in England but focusing on the recently-
enacted and ‘ground-breaking’ Homelessness Reduction Act 2017,3  this article exposes how 
the 2017 Act, a State instrument of apparent homelessness prevention, be read and 
understood as contributing to rather than obviating the exclusion and marginalisation of 
those experiencing homelessness.4 The first and, to-date, most detailed report into the 
operation of the 2017 Act (Local Government & Social Care Ombudsman, 2020) has revealed 
profound weaknesses in compliance by local authorities with the new law and identified key 
failings in how local councils were implementing its duties which, it found, ultimately 
undermine the core ambitions of the Act. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the 
 
3 This article focuses on the position in England. Housing is a devolved issue and thus law 
and policy have developed quite discretely in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and 
these devolved matters fall outside the scope of this work. 
4 The terms ‘those experiencing homelessness’ and ‘homeless people’ are used in this article 
in preference to ‘the homeless’ as the latter can be construed as itself contributing to the 
marginalisation of those living through homelessness: see, for example, Nichols et al (2018). 
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2017 legislation, once set within the context and history of homelessness legislation in 
England, can be seen as furthering rather than challenging or ‘fracturing’ marginalisation of 
the homeless population. 
 
The article proceeds in 4 parts. Part one examines the concepts of social exclusion and 
marginalisation and their relationship to homelessness. Part two introduces Jacobs, Kemeny 
and Manzi’s (1999) minimalist/maximalist approach to homelessness discourse as a 
productive analytical lens through which to explore social exclusion in homelessness law and 
policy before this framework is deployed, in Part three, to critique how those experiencing 
homelessness are represented and ‘governed’ under the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. 
Through an examination of the central provisions of the 2017 legislation, it is argued that the 
new law shifts spasmodically; oscillating between and responding to both minimalist and 
maximalist instincts and impulses. It is contended that, in key respects and counter to the 
stated ambitions of the new law, the 2017 Act advances a minimalist agenda, promoting 
advanced liberal notions of self-work, of ethical incompleteness and offers a construction of 
those experiencing homelessness according to notions of threat and dis-engagement. The Act 
projects images of homeless people as pathologized and uncooperative thus furthering as 
opposed to fracturing long-standing social exclusion of this vulnerable population. The article 
concludes by musing on how more dynamic, person-centred homelessness legislation could 
genuinely achieve the preventive objectives of the 2017 Act and promote social inclusion. 
 
MARGINALISATION, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND HOMELESSNESS 
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The concepts of marginalisation and social exclusion have long been contested and have 
provoked intense debate amongst academics across diverse disciplines seeking to unpack and 
define these terms; identify their limits and probe their potentiality as theoretical frames. At 
its most fundamental level, marginalisation and social exclusion describe a lack of social 
inclusion; an othering, a forcing of individuals or groups out from the protective centre to the 
borders of society. Allied to this is the undeniable, if not always easy to delimit, connection 
between social exclusion and the notion of poverty. As Room (1995, p. 105) has helpfully 
explained, poverty focuses on distributional issues (i.e. a lack of resources) while social 
exclusion focuses on relational issues and connotes, ‘inadequate social participation, lack of 
social integration and power.’ Expressed differently, Marsh and Mullins (1998, p. 752), 
drawing on notions of the political, social and civil rights of citizenship as explored by T. H. 
Marshall (1950), summarise social exclusion as, ‘the failure of certain citizens to enjoy full 
citizenship rights.’ Thus, as Room has explained, where citizens are prevented from securing 
their social citizenship rights, they ‘will tend to suffer processes of generalised and persisting 
disadvantage and their social and occupational participation will be undermined’ (Room, 
1995, p.7). Before this article moves to explore whether the 2017 homelessness law operates 
as an accelerator rather than an alleviator of marginalisation of those experiencing 
homelessness, the relationship between homelessness and social exclusion must be 
unpacked. 
 
Homelessness and social exclusion are commonly and fruitfully explored together in academic 
and policy debate. Homelessness denotes the state of not having a home or, more precisely 
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and legalistically, having ‘no accommodation available for … occupation.’5 In this sense, 
homelessness is the totemic example of living on the margins; the very epitome of what it 
means to be excluded from enjoyment of full citizenship rights. Street homelessness, in 
particular, is the quintessence of what it means to be cut off from society; quite literally, out 
in the cold. Those without access to housing find themselves not just locked out of the housing 
market but also often excluded from family, from the labour market, from education and 
healthcare services and from what Anderson (1999, p. 156) has described as the ‘wider 
aspects of well being in social participation taken as “usual” among the majority in society.’ 
To be homeless is to be on the fringes of society; to be at a social disadvantage and to be 
socially (and spatially) marginalised. Homelessness can lead to social alienation, damaging 
repeated cycles of homelessness-rehousing-homelessness and even disenfranchisement and 
powerlessness. Social exclusion is the ‘process of progressive social rupture, detaching groups 
and individuals from social relations and institutions and preventing them from full 
participation in the normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which they live’ 
(Silver (1997, p.15).  This notion of social exclusion as social rupture is particularly apposite in 
the homelessness context in that it captures powerfully the experience so often recounted 
by homeless people of being steadily removed from meaningful participation in society as a 
result of their housing deprivation and routinely feeling invisible even when in plain sight 
 
5 As defined in s175(1) of the Housing Act 1996. On this definition, those staying with friends, 
sofa surfing, squatting, living in unfit housing affecting health or in hostels, B&Bs, night 
shelters and those at risk of domestic violence are considered legally ‘homeless.’ 
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(Walker, 2019). Almost by definition, then, those experiencing homelessness are 
incontrovertibly the most excluded in our community: socially, politically, and spatially. 
 
Increases in homelessness and social exclusion are fuelled by the lack of affordable, secure 
housing (resulting in the rationing by the State of scarce housing resource (Shelter, 2019)), 
changes to the welfare system (in particular since 2010 and the introduction of Universal 
Credit on a rolling basis from 2013) (Hichman et al, 2018), the lack or otherwise limited 
regulation of the private and social sector housing (Wilson et al, 2019) as well as obstacles to 
accessing housing support (St Mungo’s, 2018) and the often uneasy relationship between 
housing and immigration policies (McKee et al, 2021). Thus, these macro-drivers of housing 
exclusion are a complex amalgam of structural, institutional as well as individual factors. 
Moreover, housing exclusion is not experienced equally with particular geographies and 
demographics suffering disproportionately including the young, BAME groups, low-income 
households and those in highly-populated urban areas (UK Collaborative Centre for Housing 
Evidence, 2019; Homelessness Monitor: England, 2021). We see across the housing landscape 
as a whole how housing policy, State intervention (and lack of it) is implicated in and 
responsible for creating the environment in which social exclusion through housing precarity 
flourishes. 
 
As Somerville (1998, p.762, 772) explores, social exclusion involves, ‘a sense of social isolation 
and segregation from the formal structures and institutions of the economy, society and the 
State,’ and, ‘social exclusion through housing happens if the effect of housing processes is to 
deny certain social groups control over their daily lives, or to impair enjoyment of their wider 
citizenship rights.’ Unpacking this, it can be argued that homelessness contributes to social 
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exclusion in two principal senses: first, in a direct sense, citizens without access to housing 
are unable to participate fully in society and thereby are barred from exercising their 
citizenship rights to the fullest. Secondly, in an indirect sense, in that housing confers social 
capital on individuals and has consequences for social standing, status, class, employment 
opportunities, social mobility, life chances and social cohesion all of which those living 
through homelessness cannot access (Lee & Murie, 1997). Hence, inherent in the very notion 
of housing provision is the potential for both inclusionary as well as exclusionary impacts: 
inclusionary if housing is available; exclusionary when it is unavailable. By way of example, 
the large-scale house-building programmes initiated from 1945 into the 1970s which, despite 
some academic disagreement as to their precise impact, brought quality and affordable 
houses to the masses and the associated slums clearance schemes demonstrate social 
inclusion through housing policy. In sharp contrast, the well-publicized unaffordability and 
poor quality of the burgeoning private rental market seen in the last two decades; falling rates 
of homeownership and the confinement of the young to ‘Generation Rent’ in England provide 
contemporary illustrations of social exclusion through housing. Just as the concept of social 
exclusion is itself ambiguous, shifting and contested so too are discourses of homelessness, 
its causes and the appropriate policy and legal response. The focus of this article, however, is 
to ask what role does the law play, and more specifically, what role does the new the 
Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 play in this vacillation between housing law and policy as 
the site of both social inclusion and social exclusion.  
 
MINIMALIST AND MAXIMALIST DISCOURSES OF HOMELESSNESS LAW AND POLICY 
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A productive lens through which to explore the relationship between homelessness law, 
policy and social exclusion is offered by Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi. Jacobs, Kemeny and 
Manzi (1999) advance an account of homelessness provision in England that distinguishes 
between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ discourses. This analysis is instructive in elucidating the 
inter-relationship and contestation of homelessness, social exclusion and marginalisation in 
providing a rewarding framework through which to examine the extent to which housing law 
and policy alleviates or contributes to social exclusion. Minimalist discourses engage a narrow 
definition of homelessness under which those experiencing homelessness are implicated as 
the cause of their own housing displacement which, on this view, is the result of their own 
fecklessness, personal pathology, choices, shortcomings and (in)actions. Policy approaches 
motivated by and responding to a minimalist discourse of homelessness are those which 
centre on changing the behaviour of homeless individuals. A minimalist account emphasises 
the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving homeless applicant; the former 
being accepted as in need of support with the view that homelessness arises through no fault 
of their own; while the latter is regarded as responsible for their own homelessness as a result 
of their inappropriate behaviour (for example, rent or mortgage arrears or antisocial 
behaviour). Equally, a distinction is drawn between single homeless people who are expected 
to take responsibility for themselves and for whom broad homeless support would be a 
disincentive to improve their behaviour; and the genuinely ‘needy’ homeless such as those 
with young children for whom support should be given. Policy measures premised on a 
minimalist discourse prioritise and are conditional on acceptance of and ‘buy-in’ to defined 
behavioural norms such as employment training requirements and demonstrating a 
commitment to active job-seeking. Additionally, minimalist discourses routinely spring from 
and are justified on the grounds of financial constraint and of the need for resource rationing.  
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By contrast, a maximalist homelessness discourse takes a ‘structuralist’ and broader view of 
the circumstances and moral blameworthiness of homelessness. Homelessness is defined 
expansively as capturing any individual with a housing need and anyone without access to 
appropriate housing; widely construed. Unlike minimalist discourses which fixate on the 
behaviour of homeless people, maximalist discourses locate the cause of homelessness as 
structural requiring far-reaching policy intervention by the State. On this view, people 
become homeless because of a lack of supply of affordable housing, inadequate welfare 
benefits, poor housing regulation and as a consequence of failures by the State in the 
provision of social services. On a maximalist conception, rent or mortgage arrears are 
accepted as arising from structural, economic or social factors such as a loss of employment, 
illness and relationship breakdown for which the individual homeless person is not regarded 
as morally blameworthy. Those forced into unemployment and homelessness as a result of 
the Covid-19 pandemic and its far-reaching socio-economic implications would be construed, 
on a maximalist account, as lacking moral culpability for the deleterious housing (amongst 
other) consequences provoked by the global health crisis. Policy measures engaging a 
maximalist discourse advocate broad housing provision without conditionality, restrictions or 
qualifications which generally limit housing to those can demonstrate a lack of fault for their 
homelessness.  
 
We might argue that central to Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi’s minimalist/maximalist frame is 
the question or exercise of the allocation of responsibility for the incidence of homelessness. 
We can interpret the distinct minimalist and maximalist approaches to homelessness 
provision as motivated by polarised interpretations of who or what institution should 
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shoulder the responsibility and burden of housing precarity. On a minimalist account, the 
individual homeless applicant is identified as responsible for their own housing circumstances 
where, by contrast, on a maximalist account, the State is identified as perpetrating or failing 
to prevent homelessness in the face of broader structural, social and institutional conditions. 
Seeing and reading Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi’s minimalist/maximalist framework through 
this prism of the allocation of responsibility (or perhaps more provocatively the 
apportionment of moral blame) for the occurrence of homelessness highlights the 
productivity of this analytical lens and makes the connection between social exclusion and 
the fundamental, long-standing tension that exists in homelessness law and policy of 
individual responsibility versus State responsibility for homelessness. 
 
How, then, are we to construe homelessness legislation and policy in England: as operating 
according to a minimalist or a maximalist discourse and what can this analytical framework 
tell us about the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 and its relationship to the marginalisation 
of homeless people? This will be explored in the coming sections and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the picture is revealed as mixed and varied. As this article will demonstrate, homelessness 
policy from the 1970s to the 1990s and now under the 2017 Act reflects an oscillation 
between competing minimalist and maximalist discourses often with minimalist and 
maximalist provisions operating cheek-by-jowl in the same legislative instrument. This has 
particular ramifications for an assessment of the inclusionary and exclusionary effects of the 
legislation and what this can tell us about marginalisation of homeless people through law. 
Before we turn, however, to the new legislation under the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, 
it is instructive to explore briefly how the broader legislative scheme governing homelessness 
provision in England, under the Housing Act 1996 and the forerunner to the 1996 Act, the 
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Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, fit into the context of social exclusion and how it 
should be understood according to minimalist/maximalist accounts of law and policy. 
Homelessness law did not begin with the 2017 Act and thus we must first examine the 1977 
and 1996 legislation. 
 
(i) The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 
 
The 1977 legislation (De Friend, 1978; Crowson, 2013) heralded the first statutory definition 
of homelessness in England and Wales and imposed on local authorities, for the first time, a 
duty to house those broadly-defined as homeless. Yet the 1977 Act, introduced through a 
Private Members’ Bill, was itself, at its heart, a compromise and arrived only after extensive 
bargaining between pressure groups, central and local government thus amply 
demonstrating ‘the playing out of competing discourses’ (Clapham 1999, p.81). So, while the 
legislation, on one view, might be seen as a win for maximalist discourses in that it extended 
State assistance to citizens not previously protected and rooted the definition of 
homelessness to notions of an absence of accommodation or accommodation that it was 
‘reasonable’ to occupy, strong lobbying from proponents of a minimalist homeless discourse 
succeeded in implanting deep conditionality into the legislation. Thus, a range of restrictions 
on qualification for housing support were entrenched in the legislation which sought to bar 
or exclude certain categories of applicant. The result was that local authorities only owed a 
homelessness duty if a homeless applicant could show she fell within the statutorily 
circumscribed criteria for qualification of ‘priority need,’ ‘intentionality’ and ‘local 
connection.’  
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These legislative obstacles which endure today, albeit in amended form, represented a clear 
victory for advocates of a minimalist approach (including Conservative ministers at the time) 
who saw these restrictions as necessary to both limit the burdens on local government and 
ensure support went to those ‘deserving’ of help. The 1977 Act therefore granted to 
authorities considerable latitude to reject applicants; seemingly according to an assessment 
of who was ‘deserving’ of assistance. Well into the 1990s, much political fervour and many 
newspaper column inches were expended seeking to shame and deter so-called ‘social 
security scroungers’ (Clarke, 1990) including single women who would, it was claimed, get 
pregnant to secure housing (Crowson, 1994). Whole groups of homeless people were 
therefore presented as agents of their own misfortune and the inclusion of ‘priority need’ and 
‘intentionality’ in particular can be seen as clear examples of the continued potency and 
prevalence of the deserving/undeserving distinction redolent and so emblematic of the Old 
English Poor Laws. Largely, women with dependent children were to be regarded as 
‘deserving’ and single homeless individuals as ‘undeserving’ on the basis that they were 
faineant, work-shy or, at least, would be disincentivised if housing support were to be offered. 
Exclusion from assistance on the grounds of some measure of perceived behavioural defect 
was therefore resonant in the backdrop to the 1977 law. 
 
(ii) The Housing Act 1996 
 
The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 Act was later consolidated into the Housing Act 
1996 (Cowan, 1996) which, in key respects, maintained the essential framework of the 1977 
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legislation. Part VII of the Housing 1996 Act as amended6 remains the key source and 
scaffolding of homelessness law in England even after the enactment of the 2017 Act. The 
1996 Act builds on but does not overhaul the approach adopted under the Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Act 1977. Thus, under Part VII, a homeless applicant will only be owed the so-called 
‘main housing duty’ if the applicant is: (i) eligible for assistance; (ii) in ‘priority need'; (iii) not 
intentionally homeless; and (iv) can demonstrate a local connection to the local authority 
area.7 The effect, in the same vein as the 1977 Act, is that the 1996 legislation ‘confers 
legitimacy’ (Somerville 1998, p.777) on certain individuals who can surmount, in other words, 
jump through these legislative hoops.  
 
Again, as we saw with the 1977 Act, the provisions of the 1996 legislation operate according 
to competing maximalist and minimalist tendencies. So, the 1996 Act is maximalist in that 
homeless applicants who can bring themselves within the circumscribed qualification criteria 
are entitled to a wide range of support services, advice and ultimately the provision of 
housing. In this way, the homelessness legislative framework operates, arguably, in a socially 
inclusive manner. A good example is the categories of ‘priority need,’ which were broadened 
under the 1996 Act and include the pregnant, those living with dependent children, those 
vulnerable as result of old age, illness, disability or other reason; those homeless or 
 
6 The Housing Act 1996 has been amended, inter alia, by the Homelessness Act 2002, Localism 
Act 2011, Housing & Planning Act 2016 and the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. 
7 Housing Act 1996 sections 185, 186, 189, 191, 175 and 199 respectively. The main housing 
duty requires the local authority to provide suitable temporary accommodation to the 
applicant (and any ‘associated person’) until such time as the main duty is discharged. 
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threatened with homelessness by reason of an emergency (Housing Act 1996 s189(1)). These 
categories were expanded still further in 2002 under the Homelessness (Priority Need for 
Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 to, additionally, include 16 and 17 year olds not owed 
a duty as a child in care or as care leavers; those under 21 who were in care between 16 and 
18; those who are vulnerable as a result as having lived in institutions including those over 21 
who have been in care, those who have served in the armed forces, those who have been in 
prison, and those vulnerable as a result of fleeing violence (Homelessness (Priority Need for 
Accommodation) (England) Order 2002/2051 articles 3-6). Thus while ‘priority need’ is an 
inherently conditional, gate-keeping, restrictive measure, this broadening of the categories 
can be seen as a more maximalist approach from that in the 1977 law. The strictness of the 
‘intentionality’ provision under the 1996 Act was also somewhat diluted to favour homeless 
applicants in that intentionality was now to be equated with purposiveness and a degree of 
positive action or inaction: Housing Act 1996, s191. 
 
However, beyond this, the 1996 Act remains a decisively and distinctly minimalist regime in 
which classic and characteristically minimalist measures such as gate-keeping, filtering out, 
exclusionary techniques and those designed to actively limit the obligations owed to 
homeless people prevail. The qualification criteria therefore positively exclude part or groups 
of society and thereby contribute to social exclusion. The ‘eligibility’ condition, which is first 
and foremost a question of immigration status, is the most blatant example of an 
uncompromising, social exclusionary provision under which those subject to immigration 
control are singled out, disqualified and thereby excluded altogether (subject to limited 
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exceptions).8 Equally, the requirement that a homeless applicant must not be ‘intentionally’ 
homeless is, in effect, a revival (or more accurately a survival) of the fixation of the Old Poor 
Laws on distinguishing between deserving and undeserving citizens. Unintentional 
homelessness is to be equated with deservingness; intentional homelessness with 
undeservingness with heavy undertones that the irresponsible homeless are to be specifically 
designated as undeserving of assistance. The criterion of intentionality is therefore one 
designed to cleave between appropriate and inappropriate applicants or, put differently, to 
distinguish between the legitimate homeless who are included within the protective net and 
deserving of assistance and those who are excluded, fall outside the protective net and are 
pushed to the margins (Cowan, 1991). Finally, the requirement for applicants to prove a local 
connection is, plainly, another exclusionary measure, on this occasion, operating as a 
geographic constraint on qualification for support; a method of spatial exclusion. This is 
unsurprising as the general tenor in Parliament prior to enactment of the 1996 Act was of the 
need for financial constraint on local authorities; of expressed concern at those unfairly 
gaming the system through ‘queue-jumping;’ that certain groups of homeless were being 
unduly ‘fast-tracked’ through the system and were taking precedence over other needier 
individuals.  
 
The ideology that emerged and informed the provisions of the 1996 Act was therefore a 
minimalist one: that homelessness assistance should be constrained, that perceived unfair 
 
8 The exceptions are provided in regulations: Regulation 5 of the Allocation of Housing and 
Homelessness (Eligibility) England Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1294 (as amended) and 
explained in paragraph 7.12 of the Homelessness Code of Guidance, MHCLG (Feb 2018). 
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‘special treatment’ of homeless people be redressed and, crucially, that any assistance 
offered should be short-term and not ‘life-long’ (Department of the Environment, 1995 p. 36). 
The resultant legislation therefore represents, in large part, a tightening in both the definition 
of homelessness and in the qualification criteria for support. Coupled with the residualization 
of social housing seen most evidently from the 1990s onwards, a dominant, minimalist 
discourse took hold under the 1996 Act. Homelessness was increasingly presented as a 
narrow or peripheral social problem to be equated with ‘rooflessness’ thus marking a clear 
break from the more permissive, maximalist discourse of the 1960s; a social problem in which 
universalist understanding of housing provision were undermined and in which the State 
should play a more limited role, on a short-term basis and only for those genuinely ‘deserving’ 
and in need. 
 
THE HOMELESSNESS REDUCTION ACT 2017: OPERATIONALISATING THE 
MINIMALIST/MAXIMALIST FRAMEWORK 
 
This section deploys and operationalises Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi’s minimalist/maximalist 
framework in relation to the 2017 Act (Bevan, 2021, Cowan, 2019, Loveland, 2018) 9 to probe 
what this can tell us of the marginalisation and social exclusion of those experiencing 
homelessness in contemporary homelessness law and policy. Given the stated ambitions and 
indeed the explicit nomenclature of the 2017 Act (namely the reduction of homelessness), 
 
9 The 2017 Act came into force on 2nd April 2018 but began life as a Private Members’ Bill of 
Bob Blackman Conservative MP for Harrow East who described it as, ‘the longest and most 
expensive Private Member’s Bill to successfully become legislation.’ 
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one would anticipate the 2017 scheme to operate in a wholly inclusionary manner and that 
exclusively maximalist measures aimed at preventing housing displacement would dominate 
the new legal landscape. In part this is true. However, as will be demonstrated in this section, 
in key respects, this is not how the legislation functions. Rather, this section exposes the 
overtly minimalist impulses that sit at the heart of the legislation serving as a counterweight 
to the apparent maximalist ambitions of the new law. This section begins by identifying how 
the 2017 Act might superficially be construed as a maximalist project in both legislative 
intention and within its ‘headline’ statutory provisions before turning to locate and explore 
how the 2017 Act should, in fact, more faithfully be read and understood according to a 
distinctly minimalist discourse. 
 
The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 passed into law in April 2018, none other than the 40th 
anniversary of the enactment of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, and promised a 
culture change in homelessness law and policy. The 2017 Act (Bevan, 2021; Cowan, 2019) 
which like the 1977 law, began life as a Private Member’s Bill, and followed a lengthy review 
of existing homelessness law conducted by an independent panel of experts convened by 
housing charity Crisis in 2015, has been styled as ‘the most ambitious reform in decades’ (Sajid 
Javid, then Communities Secretary, 2018). The 2017 Act amends Part VII of the Housing Act 
1996 by expanding existing duties and ‘bolting on’ new legal duties owed by English local 
authorities to provide a sliding scale of assistance to for homeless people and those 
‘threatened with homelessness.’10 In essence, the 2017 Act compels local authorities to 
 
10 Section 1 of the 2017 Act amends s. 175 of the Housing Act 1996; s.4 amends s.195 of the 
1996 Act, s.5 inserts new s.189B and 199A and s.10 inserts new s.213B into the 1996 Act. For 
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intervene at an earlier stage to prevent and reduce homelessness. There are five central 
changes at the core of the 2017 Act. First, a renewed emphasis on the provision of advice to 
anyone threatened with homelessness (Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s2); secondly, a 
new duty to assess eligible applicants and work with them to agree a ‘personalised housing 
plan’ (Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s3); thirdly, a new duty on local authorities to 
intervene to prevent homelessness (the ‘prevention duty’) (Homelessness Reduction Act 
2017, s4) accompanied by a widened definition of ‘threatened with homelessness’ from 28 
days (originally under the 1996 Act) to 56 days (Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s1); 
fourthly, a duty on local authorities to relieve homelessness (the ‘relief duty’) (Homelessness 
Reduction Act 2017, s5); and fifthly, a new ‘referral duty’ (Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, 
s10) which places an obligation on public authorities to refer those homeless or threatened 
with homelessness to a local authority housing department.  
 
The machinery of the 2017 legislation therefore coalesces around three connected ideas: (i) 
advice and assessment; (ii) prevention; and (iii) early intervention – all of which are designed 
to prevent and mitigate homelessness. On this reading of the legislation, the 2017 Act might 
be regarded as a manifestly maximalist project in that its enactment is a recognition of the 
need for greater State intervention into the lives of those facing homelessness; an 
acknowledgment that the existing homelessness regime alone did not provide sufficient 
protection and an appreciation of the need to broaden the housing assistance owed by local 
government. This was conceded in the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill’s passage 
 
a closer examination of how the provisions of the 2017 operate, see Bevan (2021), Cowan 
(2019) and Shelter, (2018). 
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through Parliament which noted that, under the Housing Act 1996, there was a group of 
people who were left with little or no support and that there was, ‘more to be done to ensure 
that those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness receive consistently high levels of 
service across the country’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2017, 
para.6).  Indeed the statutory Guidance (to which local authorities are to have regard when 
exercising their duties under the homelessness legislation), emphasised that the 2017 Act, 
‘requires housing authorities to provide homelessness services to all those affected, not just 
those who have “priority need.”’ (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 
2018, para. 4). It was on this basis that Housing charity, Shelter, welcomed the legislation as 
representing an extension in entitlement provided to homeless people and that it placed a 
renewed focus on homelessness prevention; this support itself an indicator of the seeming 
progressive, maximalist ambitions of the Act (Shelter, 2018). The introduction of new duties 
to prevent homelessness, to refer the homelessness to housing departments and the newly-
broadened definition of ‘threatened with homelessness’ are surely measures that might be 
construed as maximalist in nature; premised on a more expansive conception politically and 
legally of homelessness and a recognition of the wider role that the State can play in reducing 
homelessness and, consequently, reducing the social exclusion experienced by those living 
through homeless. 
 
However, beyond these ‘headline’ measures, when one probes into the operation of the new 
law, the 2017 is revealed as functioning, in key respects, according to a distinctly minimalist 
discourse of homelessness. The Local Government & Social Care Ombudsman Report, Home 
Truths, coming two years after enactment of the 2017 legislation, identified key deficiencies 
in the implementation of the Act including serious delays in offering support to homeless 
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people, failures of communication with applicants already in crisis, evidence of poor practice 
around the issuing and reviewing of personalised housing plans and councils ‘gatekeeping’ of 
housing services by delaying and, in many cases, actively refusing to consider homelessness 
applications (Local Government & Social Care Ombudsman, 2020, pp.5-14). This report 
provides early and potent evidence of the new law’s, practical and real-world, minimalist 
interpretation and implementation. Yet the minimalist impulse can be located within the 
provisions of the legislation itself. How, then, does this minimalist discourse manifest?  
 
Four key examples from the 2017 Act elucidate this minimalist approach: first, the limited 
scope of the new law. It is evident on any reading of the legislation that its focus is largely on 
responding to what might be termed the ‘informational causes’ of homelessness through the 
provision of information, advice and guidance to those who are homeless or threatened with 
homelessness in a bid to assist them to avoid or lift themselves out of housing deprivation. 
Thus, the approach is minimalist; limited and constrained in large part by a predominant 
emphasis on information provision. Laudable as this may be, the 2017 law is silent on 
measures which actively tackle the broader, structural, institutional and social causes of 
homelessness. While one could argue that this legislation was never intended to meet this 
purpose, it is notable that a law which was promoted as trailblazing in its preventative 
ambitions has nothing to say as to the lack of affordable housing, wider supply problems, 
regulation of the private and social sector, poor standard and quality of existing housing stock 
nor as to housing inequalities or the essential therapeutic interventions that we know are so 
vital to preventing homelessness. Put differently, the universe of the 2017 Act is inherently 
narrow in scope and, it is argued, consequently is necessarily thin and minimalist in mentality. 
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Secondly, the overarching ideology of the new law can be construed as minimalist. It can be 
argued that the essential ideology underpinning the 2017 Act is deeply advanced liberal in 
rationality under which the image of the all-powerful, ideal of the social State has given way 
to the ‘enabling State’ under which the State is no longer required to provide all the answers 
but individuals are expected to take responsibility for their own well-being. Rose has explored 
this form of rationality and ‘rule’; noting it rests on notions of the ‘activization of the powers 
of the citizen’ (Rose, 1999) as autonomous and responsibilized subjects – activated in their 
own self-government and self-realization of their own destinies. Exemplifying this mentality, 
the 2017 Act reflects a representation, a reimagination of homeless applicants not as passive 
recipient of housing assistance but as actively engaged in taking personal responsibility for, 
to positively participate in and co-operate with local authorities to resolve their own housing 
crisis. If housing support is to be given, applicants are required, first, to self-identify as 
homeless or ‘threatened with homelessness,’ apply for assistance and thereafter submit 
themselves to assessment and agree to a personalised housing plan which, as we will see, 
amounts in spirit to a compulsory, behavioural contract. Those experiencing homelessness 
are therefore constructed as a ‘problem’ population, warranting intervention, risk 
assessment and for whom self-work and adherence to defined behavioural norms determines 
the extent to which support of the State is offered and maintained. The focus of the law is 
not on maximalist notions of broad entitlement or the structural causes of homelessness but 
rather on applicants’ behaviour and how this can be re-shaped to allow homeless people to 
liberate themselves from their own housing precarity to re-join the private sector housing 
marking. This is not just deeply advanced liberal in mentality but intensely minimalist in its 
conception of homelessness. 
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Thirdly, the minimalist underpinning of the new law is further evidenced through the duty on 
local authorities to conduct an initial assessment and to devise a personalised housing plan. 
The assessment can be interpreted as targeted at locating and redressing the threat, risk and 
‘riskiness’ of the applicant’s behaviour which led to or might lead to their homelessness. 
Thereafter, the authority will seek to agree a personalised plan setting out mandated steps 
as deemed appropriate in the eyes of the local authority; steps that the applicant must follow 
(to avoid penalty) and if not followed, the local authority’s obligations to the applicant come 
to an end and it can withdraw its support. While personalised plans are theoretically designed 
to respond to an applicant’s particular context, in reality, the plan consists of measures of 
compliance; steps that if not followed result in the termination of the authority’s duties to 
that individual. Thus, while the personalised plan details the support (and care) the applicant 
can reasonably expect from the local authority, it comprises a veiled threat of retraction of 
support in the event of non-compliance. This is an acute example of a technology of care 
operating in parallel with a measure of control aimed at keeping homeless applicants 
activated, compliant and pliable.11 Both this initial risk assessment and personalised plan are, 
therefore, chiefly centred on isolating an applicant’s problematic behaviours and devising 
measures to shift and ameliorate these behaviours. These behaviour-focused exercises are 
the epitome of a minimalist approach which, whether expressly or tacitly, implicate homeless 
 
11 In a related context, Evans (2012), has conducted work into the government of homeless 
street drinkers in Canada and the ‘dosing’ and punitive ‘probation’ rules instigated under a 
therapeutic scheme known as ‘Mountainview’ to encourage the ‘out of control’ street 
homeless back into compliance with the programme. 
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applicants as the cause of their homelessness through their own personal pathology, choices 
or (in)actions.  
 
As housing charity Shelter recently acknowledged, there is mounting evidence of authorities 
intending, ‘to give the applicant a long list of [obligatory] steps and end the [prevention/relief] 
duty if they are not happy with the progress made’ (Shelter, 2017, p.7). This exclusionary 
tactic is not prohibited in the legislation nor in the accompanying Code of Guidance. The 
consequence is that the 2017 Act reflects and espouses a redemptive quality which is so 
resonant of an advanced liberalist mentality of rule; specifically that homeless people can be 
cleansed, cured of their housing precarity by submitting to defined, obligatory patterns and 
norms of behaviour. We can usefully draw on the work of Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991) 
on the notion of enterprise of the self here: a conception of the human actor as an 
entrepreneur of him or herself, making choices to further their own interests and self-
government. As Gordon (1991, p.44) explains: ‘The idea of one’s life as the enterprise of 
oneself implies that there is a sense in which one remains always continuously employed in 
(at least) that one enterprise, and that it is part of the continuous business of living to make 
adequate provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one’s own 
human capital. This is the ‘care of the self.’’ In this way, homeless people are othered, 
constructed as marginalised, ethically incomplete, pathologized such that only adherence to 
mandated, gate-keeping steps in the personalised plan can remedy their housing crisis. This 
has strong resonance with the minimalist instinct that promotes the view that support should 
be conditional on acceptance and ‘buy-in’ to defined behavioural standards and norms as a 
means of demonstrating commitment to self-improvement. 
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A fourth and final example is the sanctions provisions embedded within the 2017 Act. Section 
7 of the 2017 Act provides that if, in the view of the local authority, there has been a 
‘deliberate and unreasonable failure to co-operate’ with the local authority in its attempts to 
comply with the prevention or relief duties, including failure to follow any of the mandated 
‘steps’ contained in a personalised housing plan, the housing authority’s duties are brought 
to an end. These are punitive provisions and are highly significant. Calls from housing charities 
for the sanction provisions to be designated ‘an action of last resort’ used only in ‘an 
exceptional or extreme situation’ such as wilful or sustained refusal to co-operate, went 
unheeded (Shelter, 2017,  p.8). Indeed, in an earlier Draft Code of Guidance, it was even noted 
that ‘prioritis[ing] attending a Jobcentre or medical appointment, or fulfilling a caring 
responsibility,’ was an example of an applicant’s failure of co-operation (Department of 
Communities & Local Communities, 2017, para. 14.51(d)). Crucially in practice, these non-
cooperation provisions promote ‘category exclusion’ in that those branded, defined (by the 
local authority) as un-cooperative are essentially ‘excluded’ from the protections of the 2017 
Act. These disciplinary, ‘tough love’ (Bob Blackman MP, 2017) provisions can therefore be 
seen as further promoting the responsibilization of homeless people and of advanced liberal 
and minimalist notions of exhorting those living with homeless to conform to norms of 
acceptable behaviour. These are equally strong echoes of the distinction between deserving 
and undeservingness so prevalent in the history of homelessness policy in England, consonant 
with a minimalist account, and which continue to sound today in the intentionality provisions 
under the 1996 Act. In short, under the new law, homeless applicants exhibiting behaviours 
of which the authority disapproves are regarded as masters of their own misfortune; 
responsible for their own homelessness and not deserving of help with support reserved for 
those who are cooperative, genuinely needy and deserving. 
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THE HOMELESSNESS REDUCTION ACT 2017: FURTHERING NOT FRACTURING 
MARGINALISATION OF THOSE EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS 
 
Examining the 2017 Act through a maximalist/minimalist frame exposes the tension at the 
heart of the new law; a tension between the seemingly express and maximalist legislative 
ambitions and the distinctly minimalist rationality underpinning key provisions of the Act. On 
one view, this conflict between competing maximalist and minimalist impulses reflects a 
continuation of the long-standing contestation within homelessness law and policy in England 
(as explored in earlier sections of this article in relation to the 1977 and 1996 Acts). On 
another view, this conclusion is indeed surprising given the general tenor surrounding the 
2017 Act; namely that the new law was a clear break from the past; was pioneering, world-
leading and novel in approach. What the analysis above has demonstrated is that such 
assertions are untenable and that the 2017 law plays out according to the traditional tussles 
between a focus on the behaviours and responsibilization of homeless people for their own 
circumstances and genuine attempts to improve the lives of those in housing difficulty. This 
can be no better illustrated than by the 2017 Act’s expansion in the definition of 
homelessness and ‘threatened with homelessness’ whilst concomitantly coupling this with 
deep conditionality around mandated housing plans, exhortation of those experiencing 
homelessness to self-work, compliance and co-operation. 
 
The result is that the 2017 Act is built upon and betrays an ideological bipolarity manifested 
through a vacillation between provisions and ‘technologies’ of care and control; an oscillation 
between support and sanction, between entitlement and exclusion. Some may seek to argue 
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that the new law’s ‘gate-keeping’ of housing support can be explained on resource grounds 
as an acknowledgment of the realities of financial constraint faced by local authorities. 
However, this would be to fail to set the new law in the specific context of the history of 
homelessness law and policy as this article has argued. When this is done, the minimalist 
impulses of the 2017 legislation appear entirely consistent with and coherent to the trajectory 
of homelessness policy in England over the past 50 years. This has troubling consequences for 
an assessment of the ability of the 2017 Act to achieve its stated objectives but also to combat 
social exclusion and marginalisation of homeless people. Whilst the extension of existing 
homelessness duties and the introduction of new duties on local authorities are, of course, to 
be welcomed, the 2017 Act maintains and promotes, in key respects, the minimalist instincts 
of the past. The preoccupation with applicants’ behaviour, the implication of the 
homelessness as responsible and responsibilized for their own housing precarity and the 
much maligned and regressive distinction between deserving and undeservingness, which the 
sanctions provisions foster, continue the work of previous legislation in this area; law which 
it is conceded has failed to adequately tackle the homelessness scourge. Only those willing to 
play the game, jump through the defined hoops and comply with the housing authority’s 
prescription of normalized housing behaviours, will qualify for assistance. We might say that 
the 2017 Act renders visible this advanced liberalist mentality by constructing an image of the 
compliant, acquiescent, submissive homeless applicant who is to be rewarded with help as 
juxtaposed with the non-compliant, excluded, resistant applicant for whom the stain of 
homelessness will remain. The 2017 legislation therefore advances a sharp opposition in its 
messaging of the ‘redeemable and compliant homeless’ versus the ‘un-redeemable, resistant 
homeless.’ This has powerful resonances with George Orwell’s work Down and Out in Paris 
and London (1933) which explores presciently and prophetically how myths encircling the 
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behaviours of homeless people are problematized and pathologized in the public realm. 
Orwell recounts, for example, how rough sleepers are moved on from the streets by police, 
how beggars are fined simply for being homeless and how the Sunday newspapers are filled 
with stories of ‘beggars who have two thousands of pounds sewn into their trousers’ (Orwell, 




Why does this analysis matter? Examining the socially exclusionary and marginalising impacts 
of previous and current homelessness legislation through an application of Jacobs, Kemeny 
and Manzi’s minimalist/maximalist frame has offered a fresh way of seeing homelessness 
legislation in this legal and policy arena. Cognizant, of course, that as Nelken (1982, 1983) has 
instructively explored, legislation is a ‘managed activity’ and rarely univocal and operating 
according to a single ideology, this article has demonstrated how this minimalist/maximalist 
analysis renders visible the competing and often-messy compromises that can exist within 
the history of our homelessness law but, most pressingly, that can even exist within the same 
piece of legislation. The 2017 Act has been offered as both a contemporary exemplar but also 
as emblematic of the lively tension that plays out between minimalist and maximalist 
homelessness discourses. In deploying Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi’s frame, the 2017 Act is 
revealed as a modern incarnation of a long-standing tussle between divergent ideologies and 
impulses: of a renewed and laudable aim to reduce homelessness but set within the 
traditional conditionality and ideologies of the 2017 Act’s forerunner, the 1996 Act.  
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What has been shown is how the 2017 Act, as a piece of legislation and instrument of the 
State, constructs images of homeless people as threat, as risk that, can be seen in a deeply 
advanced liberal conception, as autonomized, self-responsibilized citizens responsible for 
their own housing precarity. Even under this apparent ‘ground-breaking’ and overtly 
progressive statute (homeless reduction in its very nomenclature), maximalist, structuralist 
accounts are largely eschewed in favour of an enabling State; facilitating citizens to deliver 
their own ethical completeness. In short, legislation that one might reasonably expect to be 
thoroughly inclusionary can be construed and ‘read’ as marginalising rather than preventing 
homelessness. The article has argued that Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi’s minimalist/maximalist 
lens can be understood through the prism of the allocation of responsibility for the incidence 
of homelessness. Operationalised here, this interpretation exposes the long-standing 
contestation inherent in the history of homelessness law and policy in England and Wales as 
to where responsibility and moral blameworthiness for homelessness should fall: on 
individual homeless applicants or on the State implicated in the perpetration of broader 
structural, social and institutional which form the key causes of housing deprivation. This 
article therefore serves as a reminder of how competing interests, agendas and discourses 
contend for primacy often within a single instrument of legislation and, additionally, that 
legislation serves as a deeply political and ideological statement that can operate both to 
challenge as well as reinforce ideological objectives. This article has argued that, in order to 
fully understand the relationship between social exclusion, marginalisation and 
homelessness, it is critical that focus is placed on grappling with the competing accounts and 
impulses rooted in the social, political and legal construction of homelessness itself. 
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The problems of homelessness are various and complex, yet there is widespread recognition 
that the principal causes are structural. Thus, the minimalist/maximalist framework allows us 
to assess the effectiveness and, in short, prospects for success, of law in preventing 
homelessness and responding to these structural challenges. In exposing the 2017 Act as a 
contested and amalgam of minimalist and maximalist impulses of uneasy dualities through 
technologies of care and control; support and sanction, this article contributes to the catalyst 
voices for reform and, in particular, those advocating for a dynamic, person-centred, 
homelessness law. It makes the argument for a genuinely maximalist approach to legislating 
in this area as the only way to seriously tackle social exclusion and marginalisation of those 
experiencing homelessness. The essential aims of the 2017 Act will only ever be undermined 
if attention is not paid to the wider, structural barriers to homelessness reduction. Without 
such a focus, the broader, social causes of homelessness will continue to go unaddressed with 
the associated, damaging (if unintended) consequences continuing to endure such as 'gate-
keeping' of services, rationing of vital resources, continued out-of-area moves and repeat 
homelessness, with damaging impacts for children, other vulnerable applicants and for single 
adults. This article contributes to the wider debates in legal and sociological research probing 
the precise shape and form that effective responses to homelessness should take. It adds 
weight to those who argue that, if policy-makers are serious about reducing social exclusion 
and marginalisation of those experiencing homelessness, it is vital to recognise the 
deleterious impacts of the messaging, representation and construction of homeless people in 
our law. The identified and long-standing tension between minimalist and maximalist 
discourses at the heart of existing homelessness legislation that this article has exposed must 
be recognised and robustly challenged if the mistakes of the past and repetition of the well-
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worn path of failure in homelessness law and policy to tackle meaningfully homelessness and 
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